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NOTES 
THE EXPANDED ROLE OF SCHOOL 
ADMINISTRATORS AND GOVERNING 
BOARDS IN FIRST AMENDMENT STUDENT 
SPEECH DISPUTES: BETHEL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 403 v. FRASER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the close of the 1986 Term the United States Supreme 
Court issued an opinion which expanded the authority of school 
administrators and governing boards in the area of first amend-
ment student speech disputes. In Bethel School District No. 403 
v. Fraser,l the Court held that school authorities could discipline 
a student for giving a speech during a high school assembly 
which contained a sexual innuendo. Bethel School District rep-
resents a new direction by the Supreme Court in analyzing stu-
. dent speech conflicts. The Court's opinion is a departure from a 
protective first amendment analysis2 to one which permits local 
governing boards to set the standard in their own school 
district.3 
1. 106 S.Ct. 3159 (1986). 
2. See e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (1966». Tinker concerned the right of three high 
school students to wear black armbands to school as a sign of their opposition to the war 
in Vietnam. The Court's definition of speech included the symbolic statement of the 
three students. Id. at 505. The Court said that students and teachers do not "shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 
506. The Supreme Court held that the authorities may regulate the school environment 
but the regulations must meet constitutional standards. The Tinker standard is usually 
stated as a concern for whether the speech materially interfered with the educational 
process. Id. at 509. 
3. 106 S.Ct. at 3165. The Court said, "The determination of what manner of speech 
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In Bethel School District the Supreme Court majority held 
that limits could be placed upon the content of student speech 
considered to be indecent by school officials, even though the 
school district had conceded that the statement did not meet the 
legal test for obscenity" Prior to Bethel School District the Su-
preme Court's first amendment jurisprudence protected the con-
tent of speech, but allowed government to regulate conduct 
through procedural time, place and manner regulations.6 Al-
though the Supreme Court has considered other aspects of first 
amendment disputes within the schools in the past few years,S 
Bethel School District is the first United States Supreme Court 
opinion to evaluate the content of student speech and to place a 
limit on first amendment rights since Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent School District7 was decided in 1969. 
In Bethel School District the Court employed a balancing 
test to evaluate content. The nature of the institution and gov-
ernment's objectives in regulating that institution were balanced 
against the first amendment rights of the individual,8 The Su-
preme Court concluded that it was within the school board's 
powers to determine "what manner of speech in the classroom or 
in school assembly is inappropriate. liD 
4. See Fraser v. Bethel School District No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1361, n.5 (9th Cir. 
1985). See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1975) for the Court's legal definition 
of obscenity. The Court's definition is whether an average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, would find that the description of sexual conduct (i) appeals 
to the prurient interest in sex; (ii) portrays sex in a patently offensive way; and (iii) does 
not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
5. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) and Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92 (1972); in both of those cases the Court invalidated breach of the peace statutes. 
The Supreme Court held that the disputed ordinances were content based and imper-
missible under the first amendment. The right of government to enact procedural regula-
tions was upheld. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Supreme 
Court held that speech advocating an unpopular point of view was protected by the first 
amendment unless the speaker's words incited "imminent lawless action." [d. at 449. 
6. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Pico, 757 U.S. 853 (1982) (removal of library 
books from a school library); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (public forums and 
equal access to religious groups at a state university); Bender v. Williamsport School 
Dist., 106 U.S. 1326 (1986), meeting of high school students' religious club on campus. 
7. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
8. 106 S.Ct. at 3164. The Court said, "The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopu-
lar and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the soci-
ety's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate 
behaviour." 
9. 106 S.Ct. at 3165. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol17/iss2/3
1987] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 259 
The Court's opinion represents an expansion of a "school 
law exception" restricting students' constitutional rights within 
the public school setting.lO The Court has given school officials 
more restrictive authority based upon the particular nature of 
the institution and the need for discipline in the schools.ll By 
employing a balancing test the Court has avoided stating a legal 
definition to measure future first amendment disputes between 
students and administrators. The facts of each particular dis-
pute will have to ,be evaluated and weighed. The emphasis on 
the special setting and the Supreme Court's utilization of a bal-
ancing test represents a shift in emphasis concerning the govern-
ance of the schools and of constitutional rights within the 
schools. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The dispute in Bethel School District concerned a nominat-
ing speech Fraser made on behalf of a classmate during a high 
school assembly convened to hear candidates for student office. 
Fraser's speech contained a metaphor about male sexuality. 12 
After the assembly, the school district charged him with violat-
10. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The Court upheld a school law 
exception in the fourth amendment area. The Court held that evidence of drugs and 
money was admissible when school authorities had "reasonable cause" to conduct a 
search. The holding was a departure from the probable cause standard. In arriving at its 
holding, the Court balanced " ... the school-child's legitimate expectations of privacy 
and the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning 
can take place." [d. at 340. The Court based its exception on the school setting. The 
Court rejected the in loco parentis doctrine that school officials act in place of parents 
during school hours, and therefore have parental powers which are not subject to consti-
tutional restraints. The Court affirmed that school authorities were subject to constitu-
tional considerations and cited Tinker for that proposition. However, the Court gave to 
school authorities expanded control as state officials in the fourth amendment area. 
11. 106 S.Ct. at 3166 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)). 
12. Fraser v. Bethel School Dist., 755 F.2d at 1357. The following was Fraser's nomi-
nating speech: 
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character 
is firm-but most of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is 
a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to 
the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing until 
finally-he succeeds. 
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the cli-
max, for each and everyone of you. 
So vote for Jeff for ASB vice-president-he'll never come 
between you and the best our high school can be. 
3
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ing its disruptive conduct rule and suspended him for three 
days.13 
Fraser was an honor student and a member of the debate 
team. He had received the "top speaker" award in statewide de-
bate championships for the past two years. At the time the 
speech was made he was a graduating senior. As part of the dis-
ciplinary action imposed on him, the school district removed his 
name from a list of candidates who were to be on the ballot for 
graduation speaker. 
Fraser filed suit in federal district court with his father as 
guardian ad litem and charged a violation of his civil rights 
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,.· claiming that the Bethel School 
had abridged his freedom of speech as protected by the first and 
fourteenth amendments. III The United States District Court 
ruled in his favor, issued a declaratory judgment, and awarded 
him $12,750 in costs and attorneys fees!6 The court also issued 
an injunction enjoining the school district from preventing Fra-
ser from participating as a commencement speaker in the gradu-
ation exercisesP 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court, and went on to hold that Fraser's 
speech was not materially disruptive to the educational process 
as required by Tinker v. Board of Education!8 Under Tinker 
the school district was required to offer evidentiary proof that 
there was a material disruption in order to justify its discipli-
nary action. The Court of Appeals also held that the school dis-
trict could not discipline him for speech which the authorities 
considered to be indecent. The court noted that the school dis-
13. Id. at 1357 n.l. The rule, which was published in the school's student handbook, 
stated: 
In addition to the criminal acts defined above, the commission of, or participation in 
certain noncriminal activities or acts may lead to disciplinary action. Generally, these are 
acts which disrupt and interfere with the educational process. 
Disruptive Conduct. Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the 
educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or 
gestures. 




18. 393 U.S. 503. 
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trict had conceded that the speech was not legally obscene,19 in 
which case it would have been outside of first amendment pro-
tection. The court reasoned that the first amendment standard 
under Tinker required a test of material disruption and not 
"inappropriateness. "20 
The Ninth Circuit discussed the district court's evidentiary 
findings and noted that the only evidence presented by the 
school district to support its contention that the speech materi-
ally disrupted the assembly was the testimony of one counselor. 
He said that only three students, sitting on different sides of the 
auditorium, indicated any overt response to the speech. The ma-
jority for the Ninth Circuit determined, based upon the testi-
mony of the school counselor, that "the reaction of the student 
body 'was not atypical to a high school auditorium assembly' "21 
and thus was not disruptive. 
The only other evidence presented by the school district 
was the testimony of a home economics teacher, who said that 
during class the next day her students expressed so much inter-
est in Fraser's speech that she devoted approximately ten min-
utes to a discussion of it.22 The majority for the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the school district had failed to prove that Fra-
ser's speech materially interfered with the educational process as 
required by Tinker.23 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the school district's argument 
that it could discipline Fraser because the speech was made at a 
school-sponsored function. The school district had argued that 
the student audience was a "captive" audience, and therefore 
the authorities had an obligation to protect the students from 
indecent speech.24 The Ninth Circuit did not accept the argu-
ment. The court distinguished between unwanted intrusions into 
the privacy of the home, and the public nature of a high school 
assembly.21! 
19. 755 F.2d at 1361 n.5. 
20. Id. at 1361. 
21. Id. at 1359-1360. 
22. Id. at 1360. 
23. Id. at 1359. 
24. For its captive audience argument the school district relied upon Federal Com· 
munications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See note 31. 
25. 755 F.2d at 1362-1363. 
5
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF BETHEL 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 403 v. FRASER 
The United States Supreme Court came to a different con-
clusion than the Court of Appeals based upon the evidentiary 
record.26 The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the 
school district had the authority to regulate student speech it 
considered to be indecent.27 
The majority opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Burger. 
He found the facts of this case to be distinguishable from the 
symbolic speech dispute in Tinker.28 Tinker concerned the right 
of three high school students to wear black armbands to school 
as a sign of their opposition to the war in Vietnam. The majority 
asserted that the first amendment protection afforded to the 
students in Tinker did not apply to the facts of the Bethel 
School District dispute. In evaluating the content of both state-
ments the Court differentiated between the political statement 
in Tinker and Fraser's campaign speech. The Court determined 
that greater first amendment protection should be afforded to 
the symbolic political speech in Tinker than to Fraser's speech.29 
26. There is a disagreement as to how disruptive and disturbing Fraser's speech was. 
The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals came to different cunclusions based upon 
the evidence. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the testimony of the high 
school counselor and home economics teacher was not enough evidence. 
The Supreme Court majority concluded that "the speech could well be seriously 
damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the 
threshold of awareness of human sexuality. Some students were reported as bewildered 
by the speech and the reaction of mimicry it provoked." 106 S.Ct. at 3165. 
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion stated that there was no evidence in the 
record to indicate that any student either male or female found the speech "insulting." 
[d. at 3168 n.2. 
Justice Marshall, dissenting, also found that the school district had failed to present 
sufficient evidence that the speech was disruptive. [d. at 3168-3169. 
Fraser, in an interview given shortly after the Supreme Court opinion was issued 
said, "In a lower court, a nurse from another school district testified that if she had been 
in the audience, which she wasn't, and if she had been 14 years old, she would have been 
upset by my speech. Distorting this testimony, Chief Justice Burger stated that 14 year 
old girls were extremely upset by the speech." L.A. Daily J., July 18, 1986, § 1, at 4, col. 
3. 
27. 106 S.Ct. at 3163. 
28. See supra note 2 for the Tinker standard. 
29. Justice Burger said, "The marked distinction between the political 'message' of 
armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent's speech in this case seems to 
have been given little weight by the Court of Appeals." 106 S.Ct. at 3163. 
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Chief Justice Burger's opinion was supported by two earlier 
United States Supreme Court opinions which had permitted 
government intervention to protect minors from indecent speech 
and indecent publications. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation30 a 
plurality held that indecent speech which was not legally ob-
scene could be regulated when broadcast over the radio. 31 In 
Ginsberg v. State of New York 32 the Court affirmed the govern-
ment's power to enact legislation which protected minors from 
"harmful" publications.33 
The Court's opinion in Bethel School District was based 
upon the idea that the function of public education is to prepare 
30. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
31. Justice Stevens delivered the plurality opinion in Pacifica. The Court held that 
indecent speech (a twelve·minute monologue titled "Filthy Words") could be regulated 
because it was broadcast over the airwaves. A man who was driving in his car with his 
son heard the broadcast which was aired in the afternoon. He filed a complaint with the 
F.C.C. The F.C.C. ruled that the broadcast was indecent. The Supreme Court plurality 
reasoned that the broadcast reached listeners in the privacy of their homes, where some 
might be unwilling, and thus a "captive" audience. The Court also reasoned that the 
broadcast could reach children who were too young to read, were not in school, and who 
had no control over what they might be hearing. The plurality opinion concluded that it 
was within the F.C.C.'s power to regulate speech which was not legally obscene. The 
plurality put forth a theory that there could be a hierarchy placed upon the value of 
speech with varying degrees of constitutional protection. [d. at 746. 
32. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
33. Ginsberg was convicted under a statute of selling a pin.up magazine, which was 
"harmful to a minor," to someone under the age of 17 years old. The question of whether 
the magazine was legally obscene was not before the Court. However, the Court noted 
that "obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press." [d. at 634 (citing 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476). The Court held that the statute could be drafted so 
that it was more restrictive in allowing minors access to the publication than it would be 
to adults. They held that this diu not abridge a minor's constitutional right to freedom 
of expression. 
The Court's justification for finding a violation, even though it was not a crime to 
sell the publication to adults, was that "the concept of obscenity or of unprotected mat· 
ter may vary according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed or 
from whom it is quarantined." [d. at 636. 
The Court reasoned that it was within the State's power to enact health and safety 
legislation for the well·being of its children. They affirmed the New York statute on 
rational basis grounds, finding obscenity to not be protected speech requiring a height· 
ened level of scrutiny. 
In Ginsberg, the Court affirmed government's role to enact legislation which pro· 
tected minors from "harmful" publications. The court indicated that there could be lim· 
its which would not invade "the area of freedom of expression constitutionally secured to 
mihors." [d. at 637. In Pacifica and Ginsberg the Court permitted limits on first amend· 
ment expression where speech was of a lesser value than "core political speech," and 
when it was within the legislative powers of government to enact rules for the well being 
of its children. 
7
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students "for citizen::.hip in the Republic. . . . "34 The majority 
asserted that the schools must teach the social values of a de-
mocracy which include "habits and manners of civility as values 
in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to 
the practice of self-government in the community and the na-
tion."3& The Supreme Court majority gave great deference to the 
local school board and to the societal values which members of it 
hold as political representatives.36 
The Court's opinion is that the school's function to teach 
social values encompasses regulation of speech which school ad-
ministrators find offensive. The majority noted that the Manual 
of Parliamentary Procedure drafted by Thomas Jefferson pro-
hibited the use of impertinent or indecent speech in the House 
of Representatives.37 Thus, even if Fraser's speech was a politi-
cal speech, Fraser's choice of words would not have received first 
amendment protection under Jefferson's guidelines because of 
its content. 
The Court noted that support for the authority of the Gov-
erning Board to regulate student speech disputes could be found 
in Ambach v. Norwick.3s In Ambach the Supreme Court held 
that a New York state statute prohibiting any person who was 
not a citizen of the United States from teaching in the public 
school system did not violate the equal protection clause of the 
United States Constitution. The Court found no constitutional 
violation and affirmed the state statute on rational basis 
grounds.3s Ambach was one of a line of cases in which the Su-
preme Court established a "public employee" exception40 to ju-
dicial review at the strict scrutiny level when alienage was a 
characte7istic of the disputed classification. 
34. 106 S.Ct. at 3164 (quoting C. Beard & M. Beard, New Basic History of the 
United States 228 (1968)). 
35. Id. at 3164. 
36. [d. at 3165. 
37. Id. at 3164. 
38. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). 
39. [d. at 76-77, citing Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). The Supreme Court 
reasoned that there could be a "public employee" exception because teachers participate 
in a governmental function which includes teaching students about citizenship and the 
administration of government. 
40. [d. at 76-77 (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
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The majority cited Ambach for the proposition that educa-
tion may be government's most important function, in part, be-
cause it teaches the cultural values of a democracy. The Su-
preme Court held in Ambach that since teachers play a critical 
role in this process, United States citizenship could be required 
of them. 
The Court found additional support for the expanded 
school board authority in a first amendment dispute in Board of 
Education v. Pica, a United States Supreme Court opinion de-
cided during the 1982 Term.41 A school board had evaluated the 
content of library books and ordered some removed because 
they were considered indecent. In Pica, a plurality of the Su-
preme Court held that "local school boards have broad discre-
tion in the management of school affairs."42 In Bethel School 
District the Court observed that, although the Pica decision was 
a plurality opinion, all of the Supreme Court justices agreed that 
a local governing board had the authority to remove books from 
a school library which the board members considered to be 
vulgar. 43 
In Pica the emphasis was on the local board's authority to 
censor the content of books which its members considered inde-
cent. In Bethel School District the Supreme Court permitted 
the governing board to censor speech which its members consid-
ered indecent. The Supreme Court's legal standard in these 
opinions is not protective of content, but rather gives deference 
to community standards which may vary from one locale to 
another. 
The Court rejected Fraser's argument that the school's dis-
ciplinary action violated his right to procedural due process of 
notice and a right to a hearing." The Court reasoned that the 
school's disciplinary conduct rule and the advance warning from 
41. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
42. [d. at 863 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1925)). 
43. 106 S.Ct. at 3165 (citing Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871-872 
(1982) (plurality opinion)); [d. at 879-881 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Id. at 918-920 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The books which were the subject of the dispute were: 
Slaughter House Five, The Naked Ape, Down These Mean Streets, Best Short Stories 
of Negro Writers, Go Ask Alice, Laughing Boy, Black Boy, A Hero Ain't Nothing But a 
Sandwich, Soul on Ice, The Fixer. Id. at 856 n.3. 
44. 106 S.Ct. at 3166. 
9
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two of his teachers that he might be subject to sanctions was 
adequate notice. In Bethel School District the Court affirmed 
the school law exception it had articulated in its last term in 
New Jersey v. T.L.D.,45 and said that the constitutional rights of 
students in the school setting was not "automatically coexten-
sive with the rights of adults in other settings."46 
In Bethel School District the Supreme Court reasoned that 
deference should be accorded to the local governing board so 
that it had enough authority to run the schools. The Court em-
phasized the distinction between political speech which was pro-
tected and speech which was not protected. The Court distin-
guished the symbolic speech dispute in Tinker from indecent 
speech which would not receive first amendment protection in 
the schools. Chief Justice Burger said, "[a]s cogently expressed 
by Judge Newman, 'the First Amendment gives a high school 
student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not 
Cohen's jacket.' "47 Cohen was convicted of disturbing the peace 
in the Los Angeles County courthouse. He wore a jacket which 
had an epithet on it expressing opposition to the draft. The 
United States Supreme Court reversed his conviction. The Court 
found Cohen's speech to be protected by the first amendment. 
The Court held that it expressed his own opinion and there was 
no intent to disrupt.48 In Bethel School District the Supreme 
Court concluded that Fraser's sexual metaphor was not a politi-
45. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). See supra note 10. 
46. 106 S.Ct. at 3164. 
47. [d. at 3164-3165 (citing Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School 
District, 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (CA 2 1979) (opinion concurring in result). Thomas con-
cerned a dispute over a student produced off-campus newspaper which was alleged to be 
indecent. The court held that administrators could not punish students for off-campus 
activities. The court never reached the issue as to whether the publication was indecent. 
The concurring opinion discussed whether or not the publication was protected by the 
first amendment. The concurring opinion concluded that the authoritills could regulate 
indecent speech which was not obscene. He said, "School authorities can regulate inde-
cent language because its circulation on school grounds undermines their responsibility 
to try to promote standards of decency and civility among school children." [d. at 1057. 
48. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen the Court held that the 
statute under which Cohen was tried was too vague, and it didn't identify the interests 
which the state wished to limit. The Court asserted a high standard for government to 
meet. They said, "The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut 
off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a 
showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable 
manner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to 
silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections." [d. at 21. In Cohen the 
Supreme Court concluded that anyone who was offended could look away or continue 
10
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cal statement and therefore it was not constitutionally 
protected.49 
Justice Brennan wrote a separate concurring OpInIOn in 
Bethel School District. He reasoned that under the facts of this 
case the school district's disciplinary action was permissible be-
cause of its authority to govern the schools.IIO He distinguished 
between the level of first amendment protection which the Court 
gave to a statement which authorities considered to be indecent 
within the schools and outside of them. Brennan concurred with 
the majority's emphasis on the special setting of the school envi-
ronment. He noted that Fraser's speech did not meet the legal 
test for obscenity. He reaffirmed the Supreme Court's holding in 
Cohen, and said that government could not prohibit Fraser's 
statement as inappropriate in a non-school setting. III 
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, maintained that 
the school faculty could regulate the content of some speech, as 
long as the student involved received fair notice. He did not be-
lieve Fraser had received fair notice, however.1I2 Justice Stevens 
favored a strong presumption in favor of protected first amend-
ment expression,1I3 and went on to argue that, based upon the 
evidence in the record, Fraser's speech was not prohibited by the 
school's own disciplinary rules which required that it must have 
caused a material disruption.1I4 Justice Stevens acknowledged 
that Fraser was a good student who was respected by his peers.1II! 
He noted that there was no evidence in the Court of Appeals' 
record to indicate that any of the students found the speech of-
fensive. 1I6 He said that the dispute might, in part, be genera-
tional and that the students might be a better judge of contem-
porary standards "than is a group of judges who are at least two 
generations and 3,000 miles away from the scene of the crime."117 
walking, and that the courthouse was a public place which did not guarantee freedom 
from unwanted intrusion. 
49. 106 S.Ct. at :3164. 
50. [d. at :3167-:3168 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
51. [d. at 3167. 
52. [d. at :3169 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
53. [d. at 3172. 
54. [d. at 3170. 
55. [d. at 3169. 
56. [d. at 3169 n.2. 
57. Id. at 3169. 
11
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Stevens concluded that if the Supreme Court was going to defer 
to local community standards then the 'Court should defer to the 
federal district court and Court of Appeals which had found the 
speech to be protected. tl8 
Justice Marshall also dissented. He alone would have af-
firmed the lower court's finding that there was no material dis-
ruption of the educational process as required by Tinker.tl9 
IV. CRITIQUE 
In Tinker the Supreme Court held that the United States 
Constitution applied to students attending public schools. The 
first amendment right to freedom of speech was held applicable 
to the schools through the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment.8o Since the Supreme Court issued the Tinker deci-
sion in 1969, it has measured student speech disputes by that 
standard. The rule has been that speech is protected by the first 
amendment unless the authorities can prove that it "materially 
and substantially interferes with the requirements of appropri-
ate discipline in the operation of the schools. "61 
The Tinker court affirmed the authority of school officials 
to govern the schools.82 However, the Court said, "[o]ur problem 
lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities. "63 
The Tinker court cited Epperson v. Arkansas64 for the following 
rule concerning the level of judicial review to be accorded a dis-
pute within the public school system: "By and large, public edu-
cation in our nation is committed to the control of state and 
local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the reso-
lution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school 
systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic 
58. [d. at 3172. 
59. [d. at 3168-3169 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
60. 393 U.S. at 507 (citing West Virginia v. Barnette, :119 U.S. 624, 637 (1943), in 
which the Court said, "The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, pro-
tects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not 
excepted"). 
61. 393 U.S. at 509. 
62. 393 U.S. at 507. 
63. [d. at 507. 
64. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
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constitutional values. "6~ In Tinker the Supreme Court held that 
the authorities may regulate the school environment; however, 
the regulations must meet constitutional standards.66 This rule 
was very protective of content. It regulated conduct but did not 
censor ideas. In Tinker the Supreme Court concluded that the 
students' symbolic expression did not interfere with the work of 
the schools or interfere with the rights of other students.67 The 
Supreme Court held, "[i]n the absence of a specific showing of 
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students 
are entitled to freedom of expression of their views."68 
In the years since Tinker was decided, the federal courts 
have had occasion to rule on student speech disputes. If a court 
found that the dispute involved protected rights, a first amend-
ment analysis utilizing the Tinker standard was applied.69 If a 
court found that constitutional rights were not involved defer-
ence was given to the local governing body.70 In some instances 
the courts have held that school authorities violated first amend-
ment rights. In other instances, the courts have found that the 
authorities acted within their governmental powers and no con-
stitutional violation was found. 
Although the circuits have not always been consistent, it is 
possible to extract some principles from their holdings. In con-
flicts which concerned student newspapers, most of the courts 
have followed Tinker and held that student speech was pro-
tected unless the school district could present a compelling justi-
fication for its restriction. An opinion by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit distinguished between 
student speech made within the context of a school-sponsored 
public forum to which the Tinker standard applied, and a stu-
65. 393 U.S. at 104. The Supreme Court struck down a state statute prohibiting the 
teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools. The Court held that the statute 
violated the first and fourteenth amendments. Although this opinion affirms judicial in-
tervention when constitutional values are at stake, it is often cited for the proposition 
that the Court will not interfere with government's legitimate authority to administer 
the schools. 
66. 393 U.S. at 513. 
67. 393 U.S. at 508. 
68. 393 U.S. at 511. 
69. See note 72. 
70. See notes 71, 73, and 74. 
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dent newspaper which was produced in a journalism class which 
authorities could regulate.71 
The courts have ruled that once school authorities allow a 
public forum to develop, it must be accessible to all students.72 
When there are health and safety considerations deference has 
been given to the school's regulations.73 Similarly, when there is 
a concern for the age of the students, and in order to avoid psy-
chological harm because of their relative immaturity, school reg-
ulations will be upheld.74 A federal district court held that pri-
vacy concerns for students and their families was within the 
school district's domain.71i That decision was reversed by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and is 
presently pending before the United States Supreme Court.76 
71. See Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982). Pre-publication 
review of a journalism class produced school newspaper was upheld. The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the right of school authorities to exert their control over matters which involved 
the school curriculum. The court reasoned that since the publication was an integral part 
of the curriculum the school district could exert more control over it. [d. at 863-864. 
72. See Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977). The 
court held that a student newspaper was established as a public forum and entitled to 
first amendment protection. The school board appealed a district court order enjoining it 
from prohibiting publication of a student article about birth control. The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed. 
See Zuker v. Panitz, 299 F.Supp. 102 (S.D. N.Y. 1969). A federal district court held 
that the school district could not prohibit publication of an advertisement in a school 
newspaper opposing the war in Vietnam because it was a public forum and there had 
been other articles about the war and the draft in it. 
See San Diego Comm. v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). High school 
newspaper was a public forum and the school could not prohibit publication of an adver-
tisement from plaintiff organization opposing draft registration. 
73. See Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980). School district could 
prohibit distribution of a student produced off-campus newspaper which contained ad-
vertisement for the sale of drug paraphernalia. 
74. See Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 
(March 20, 1978). School district could prohibit distribution of a questionnaire about sex 
to ninth and tenth graders because of their age. However, it could be distributed to 
eleventh and twelfth graders. The results were to be published in the student 
publication. 
75. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F.Supp. 1450 (D.C. Mo. 1985). 
The federal district court held that two pages could be deleted from a student newspa-
per. The articles concerned teen pregnancy and divorce. The district court reasoned that 
privacy concerns for the students and their families was a compelling justification for not 
publishing the articles. 
76. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. 
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (no. 86-836). The Court of Appeals held 
that the student newspaper was a public forum and "a conduit for student viewpoint." 
The court held that the deletion of the articles violated the students' first amendment 
rights. 
14
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Allegations concerning indecent speech have been decided both 
ways.77 
In Bethel School District the Supreme Court announced a 
legal standard to measure student speech disputes which dif-
fered sharply from the Tinker approach. The court employed a 
balancing test that weighed and evaluated the content of the 
speaker's words against the government interest in prohibiting 
the speech.78 
The majority in Bethel School District did not utilize the 
Tinker analysis to measure whether the speech had a material 
disruption on the educational process. The majority disregarded 
the findings of both the federal district court and the United 
States Court of Appeals that the speech was not disruptive. The 
Supreme Court also declined to consider the public forum issues 
of the dispute which were discussed by the lower court,79 and 
which have traditionally been part of a first amendment 
analysis.80 
Instead, the majority evaluated the content of Fraser's 
speech and distinguished between the political message of the 
Tinker armbands and the sexual content of Fraser's statement.81 
The Court did not define political speech except by analogy to 
77. See Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 
U.S. 1081 (1980). Student newspaper published off-campus which contained articles of 
sexual satire was considered indecent by the school board. The students who published it 
were suspended for five days and sought injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals held 
that the students could not be disciplined because the activity took place outside of 
school. The court did not reach the issue of indecent speech. See supra note 47. 
See Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981). The court held that the school 
district did not violate the first amendment when it cancelled a play, "Pippin," because 
of its sexual theme. The court reasoned that although participation in the play was vol-
untary, it was considered a part of the theater arts curriculum and was within the school 
board's authority. 
78. 106 S.Ct. at 3164. 
79. 755 F.2d at 1365. 
80. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981), where the Supreme Court said 
that in order to justify exclusion of a student religious club from a state university the 
authorities must "show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state inter-
est and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." The Court held that the univer-
sity had created a forum open to student groups and that the religious club should also 
be allowed to meet on campus. 
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Sidewalks outside of school 
were limited public forum and may be closed if they disrupt school while it's in session. 
81. 106 S.Ct. at 3163. 
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Tinker. Without a legal definition from the Court, distinguishing 
the political from the indecent presents a problem for analyzing 
future disputes. Sometimes a statement may be both - as the 
Supreme Court held in Cohen.82 The standard becomes subjec-
tive and a matter of local community values without a definition 
from the Court. 83 In Bethel School District the Court has cre.-
ated an intermediate category of speech which neither meets its 
legal definition of obscenity,84 nor receives the protection of the 
first amendment. 
In Bethel School District the Supreme Court concluded 
that the authorities could discipline Fraser and prohibit his 
speech not because it caused a material disruption as required 
by Tinker, but because of the "school's basic educational mis-
sion. "86 The Supreme Court majority balanced the speaker's first 
amendment rights against the school district's justification for 
regulating the speech. The majority of the Court evaluated the 
content of the statement and held that it was not appropriate 
for that setting.88 The Court considered the content of Fraser's 
speech and expressed a judgment about its political value, rather 
than considering the effect the speech had on the conduct of the 
audience. 
Bethel School District's Effect on Student Speech Statutes 
In California there is an Education Code provision on the 
student exercise of free expression.87 The statute provides that 
82. See supra note 48. 
83. Shortly after this opinion was issued, Fraser discussed the Court's evaluation of 
the content of his speech, and commented on the implication that the Court's opinion 
could be used to censor ideas. He said, "The year after I graduated, for instance, the 
school administration prevented students from performing 'Working', a play by Studs 
Terkel, because it included a segment on prostitutes. But the play, based on live inter-
views, did not glorify prostitution; instead, prostitutes described how unfulfilling their 
lives are." 
"During my senior year, parents and some school board members tried to put a stop 
to a performance of 'Jesus Christ Superstar.' The play was allowed to go on, but only 
after acrimonious debate and a 3-2 vote on the school board." L.A. Daily J., July 18, 
1986, § I, at 4, col. 3. 
84. See supra note 4. 
85. 106 S.Ct. at 3166. 
86. [d. at 3166. 
87. See Cal. Educ. Code § 48907 (West Supp. 1987). Student exercise of free expres-
sion. (Former § 48916, enacted by Stats. 1976, c. 1010, and formerly § 10611.) 
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students in the public schools have the right to exercise freedom 
of speech. Expression which is "obscene, libelous, or slanderous" 
is prohibited. As is speech which disrupts "the orderly operation 
of the school." 
In 1975, the Legislative Counsel of California was presented 
with a question concerning indecent student speech. Legislation 
had been introduced to amend the Education Code provision on 
student speech.88 The question presented was whether it would 
be constitutional to require that the right to student exercise of 
free expression specifically exclude profane or vulgar expression. 
The Legislative Counsel's opinion concluded that school dis-
tricts could not prohibit indecent speech unless it also met the 
legal definition for obscenity, was libelous or caused a material 
disruption.89 The Legislative Counsel's opinion was based upon 
the constitutional standard articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Tinker and Cohen. Under the guidelines issued by the Supreme 
Court in Bethel School District a different conclusion might be 
reached if the same question was presented to the Legislative 
Counsel today, because the Court has created an indecent 
speech category for students which is based on a different legal 
standard. 
The disruptive conduct regulation adopted by the school 
district in the State of Washington90 and the California student 
speech statute are both based upon the Tinker standard. If an 
indecent student speech dispute was to occur in California, the 
California Education Code provision would offer no greater first 
amendment protection to California students then the Bethel 
School District's disruptive conduct regulation offered to Fraser. 
88. Assembly Bill 207, 1974-1975 Cal. Regular Session. (The legislation was not 
enacted.) 
89. See Advisory Opinion of the Legislative Counsel of California, June 25, 1975. 
The Legislative Counsel cited two federal circuit court opinions which concerned dis-
putes about high school newspapers (Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 
1970), and Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 333 F.Supp. 1149 (1971), va-
cated 475 F.2d 1071 (1973), reh'g denied, 475 F.2d 1404 (1973». A United States Su-
preme Court opinion was also cited which held that a student could not be disciplined 
for speech which a university considered to be indecent because of "conventions of de-
cency." See Papish v. University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973). 
90. See supra note 13. 
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The Balancing Test as Applied to Public Employment First 
Amendment Cases 
In Bethel School District the Supreme Court balanced the 
student's first amendment right to express himself against the 
school district's justification for prohibiting the speech. The 
Court has utilized a balancing test to determine whether or not 
speech was protected in first amendment cases concerning pub-
lic employees. This was first articulated in Pickering v. Board of 
Education.91 
In public employment cases the Supreme Court said that a 
balancing test was needed to protect the employee's first amend-
ment rights as a citizen balanced against the government em-
ployer's need to regulate the work environment.92 The issue in 
Pickering was whether a teacher's letter to the editor of a local 
newspaper, which was critical of the school board, was protected 
by the first amendment. The Supreme Court held that the 
school district could not dismiss the teacher because he had a 
first amendment right to speak on a matter of public concern.93 
In Pickering the Supreme Court balanced the interests of the 
individual as a citizen commenting upon a public issue against 
the interests of the state as employer.94 
In Pickering the Supreme Court concluded that the balance 
weighed in favor of the employee's first amendment right of self-
expression. The Court gave some guidelines for evaluating future 
conflicts. They reasoned that the employee's speech was pro-
tected by the first amendment because it did not interfere with 
confidentiality or the need to maintain discipline in the work 
environment. The statement was not libelous and it reflected a 
difference of opinion about a matter of public concern.91i 
In Connick v. Myers,96 a more recent dispute between a 
public employee and the government employer, the Supreme 
Court held that the balance favored government. Myers was 
91. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
92. [d. at 568. 
93. [d. at 570. 
94. [d. at 568. 
95. [d. at 570. 
96. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
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employed as an Assistant District Attorney. She circulated an 
in-house questionnaire concerning employment conditions. She 
was ordered transferred to a different division and when she re-
fused the transfer she was terminated. Myers charged that she 
was terminated for exercise of protected speech. The Supreme 
Court affirmed her discharge and held that the speech was not 
protected because it was not about a matter of public concern.97 
In Connick the Supreme Court distinguished between 
speech that concerned private matters (internal office com-
plaints) and matters of public concern.98 The Court said that 
when an employee's statement was not about a matter of politi-
calor social concern ". . . government officials should enjoy 
wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive over-
sight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment. "99 
In Connick, as in Pickering, the Court afforded more pro-
tection to speech about public issues. The Court referred to "the 
hierarchy of first amendment values."loo Consequently, some 
speech by public employees about their employer was found to 
be more protected than other speech. The Court gave as its rea-
son for emphasizing public issues a concern for first amendment 
rights of political association and a fear of chilling those 
rights. lol The Supreme Court concluded that Myers' speech was 
not on a public matter and deferred to the employer's authority 
to regulate the office environment. l02 
In each of the public employee first amendment disputes 
the Court evaluated the content of the speech, and, as a matter 
of law, it determined whether government met its evidentiary 
burden of proof for justifying its action. l03 As part of this indi-
vidualized evaluation the Court gave consideration to the gov-
ernment employer's authority to regulate the work environment. 
The Court said, "[w]hether an employee's speech addresses a 
matter of public concern must be determined by the content, 
97. [d. at 148. 
98. [d. at 147-148. 
99. [d. at 146. 
100. [d. at 145. 
101. [d. at 145 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)). 
102. [d. at 154. 
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form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole 
record. "l04 
In Bethel School District the Supreme Court used a balanc-
ing test to resolve a first amendment dispute between a student 
and the school board. The majority evaluated "the content, form 
and context" of Fraser's statement. The Supreme Court ac-
corded greater deference to the school district's authority to reg-
ulate the school environment than to Fraser's first amendment 
rights. The expanded governmental authority to regulate speech 
was based upon the institution, the school setting. 1011 Whether or 
not Bethel School District is limited to its particular facts re-
mains to be seen. The Supreme Court has issued a new and dif-
ferent standard by which to measure first amendment disputes 
in the schools which requires an individualized evaluation, simi-
lar to the balancing test used by the Court in the first amend-
ment public employee cases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Bethel School District, the Supreme Court's most recent 
opinion on a first amendment dispute in the schools, and 
Tinker, which was decided in 1969, represent a tension in the 
Supreme Court's first amendment jurisprudence. In Tinker 
there was a debate between the majority and Justice Black, who 
dissented, as to the level of constitutional protection to be given 
to student speech. Justice Black did not believe that students 
had full constitutional rights and he affirmed the authority of 
school officials to exert their control.106 In many respects the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Bethel School District appears to sup-
port Justice Black's dissent in Tinker, limiting students' consti-
tutional rights within the schools. 
Bethel School District is the first Supreme Court opinion to 
employ a balancing test to measure a student speech dispute. It 
represents a departure from the Tinker standard. Instead, it fol-
lows a line of public employee first amendment cases, in which 
the Court employed a balancing test to evaluate content. In the 
104. [d. at 147-148. 
105. 106 S.Ct. at 3166. 
106. 393 U.S. at 526 .. 
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public employee cases the Court has given greater first amend-
ment protection to public speech concerning political issues. The 
first amendment rights of the individual are balanced against 
the governmental interest in prohibiting the speech. In Bethel 
School District the Supreme Court majority concluded that Fra-
ser's speech was indecent and not political, therefore it was not 
protected by the first amendment. 
Dicta in the opinion give more weight to local control of the 
governing boards and to local community values. The Supreme 
Court has expressed greater deference to the authority of admin-
istrators to manage the schools. This opinion does not represent 
a bright line rule for practitioners. The facts of each particular 
dispute will have to be evaluated and weighed. The rules will 
develop out of subsequent interpretation of case law. 
Phoebe Graubard* 
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